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Organizational Learning in a High-Risk 
Environment: Responding to an Anthrax 
Outbreak
Shari R. Veil and Timothy L. Sellnow 
Abstract
The National Center for Food Protection and Defense, a 
Department of Homeland Security-sponsored Center of Excellence, 
identified and endorses 10 best practices for risk and crisis 
communication. The best practices model is designed to aid 
organizations of all types in preparing for and learning from crisis 
events. This analysis applied the best practices model to a case study 
of an anthrax outbreak that fostered a full-blown crisis response. This 
study analyzes the learning experience of the crisis cohort group that 
responded to the crisis. The researchers contend that by evaluating 
a crisis situation using best practices as a benchmarking procedure, 
problems within the system and new strategies can be identified. 
So What?
Evaluating best practices allows an organization to learn 
from failures and crises by establishing alternative strategies. 
This case study can serve not only as an example of how to 
use the best practices in risk and crisis communication in a 
postcrisis review, but also as a vicarious learning tool for how 
to plan an effective crisis response.
Following the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the belief that terrorism only 
happens “over there” changed dramatically. The Department of Homeland 
Security (DHS) was established and other government agencies were 
restructured in order to confront an array of threats, including nuclear 
activity, suicide bombers, biological weapons, and attacks on the nation’s 
communication systems (Wilcox & Cameron, 2006). Reallocating funds 
to guard against specific threats of terrorism, DHS created Centers of 
Excellence to “bring together leading experts and researchers to conduct 
multidisciplinary research and education for homeland security solutions” 
{
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(Department of Homeland Security [DHS], 2008, ¶ 1). One of these 
centers, the National Center for Food Protection and Defense (NCFPD), 
was established to address “the vulnerability of the nation’s food system 
to attack through intentional contamination with biological or chemical 
agents” (National Center for Food Protection and Defense [NCFPD], 2008a, 
¶ 1). The risk communication sector of the NCFPD was assigned the task 
of establishing best practices for “active engagement of multiple audiences 
in effective risk communications prior to, during and after potentially 
catastrophic food bioterrorism incidents” (NCFPD, 2008b, ¶1).
Drawing primarily on the work of Vincent Covello (1992; 2003), Peter 
Sandman (1993), Matthew Seeger (2006), and Barbara Reynolds (2002) at 
the Centers for Disease Control, and on research conducted by the Risk and 
Crisis Communication Project (a network of risk and crisis communication 
scholars), the best practices were developed through a series of case 
studies involving crisis and risk communication that included anecdotal 
observations, experience in crisis response, and media analysis (Seeger). An 
expert panel at the NCFPD then reviewed, critiqued, adjusted, and refined 
the practices to a final version of the nine best practices which, since this 
study was conducted, has expanded to include a 10th best practice (Seeger). 
The nine best practices at the time of this study were classified into strategic 
planning (planning pre-event logistics, coordinating networks, accepting 
uncertainty), proactive strategies (forming partnerships, listening to public 
concern, being open and honest), and strategic response (being accessible 
to the media, communicating compassion, providing self-efficacy) (Figure). 
The 10th practice incorporates all strategies in the form of recommending 
continuous evaluation and updating of crisis plans through process 
approaches and policy development.
This study was part of an ongoing effort to extend and refine the DHS-
NCFPD best practices model. Researchers investigated the potential for the 
best practices model to foster benchmarks for learning from crisis situations. 
Specifically, the best practices model was used to guide the postcrisis review 
of a bovine anthrax outbreak mitigated by the Biosurveillance Working 
Group, a unified cohort of veterinarians, Extension agents, and university 
researchers. 
This study introduces the best practices model as a resource for 
organizational learning and crisis planning and demonstrates how the model 
can be used to evaluate crisis planning and response efforts. 
Learning Through Crisis
Organizational crisis is defined as “a specific, unexpected, and 
nonroutine event or series of events that create high levels of uncertainty and 
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threat or perceived threat to an organization’s high priority goals” (Seeger, 
Sellnow, & Ulmer, 1998, p. 233). Despite its typically negative connotation, 
a crisis can also be characterized as an unexpected turning point in an 
organization that can have a negative or positive outcome (Fink, 1986; 
Gottschalk, 1993; Lerbinger, 1997; Mitroff, 1988; Ray, 1999; Seeger et al., 1998; 
Seeger et al., 2003; Sellnow, 1993).
As an unplanned opportunity, crisis can be viewed as a trigger point 
to a valuable organizational learning process (Murphy, 1996). Through the 
natural system of renewal, crisis can effectively purge system elements 
that are outdated and inappropriate and create new and unexpected 
opportunities for an organization (Seeger et al., 2003). This natural 
process has been described as an awakening. “The things we fear most in 
organizations—disruptions, confusion, chaos—need not be interpreted 
as signs that we are about to be destroyed. Instead, these conditions 
are necessary to awaken creativity” (Wheatley, 1999, p. 21). For some 
Figure. The best practices in risk communication developed for NCFPD.
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organizations, crisis is less a gentle awakening and more a lightning bolt 
as it shocks organizational systems out of complacency. By acting as a 
stimulus for improving the organization and by legitimizing the need for 
transformation, crisis prepares members of an organization for change by 
reducing resistance and thereby heightening consideration of alternate 
strategies (Lerbinger, 1997). Huber (1991) notes that “[a]n entity learns if, 
through its processing of information, the range of its potential behaviors 
is changed” (p. 88) and argues that the more an organization changes as a 
result of an event, the more the organization has learned. 
Simply put, organizational learning is a process of detecting and 
correcting errors (Argyris, 1982). Learning occurs when errors are identified, 
shared, and analyzed. This learning experience is then used by the 
organization to enact changes in standard operating procedures (Popper 
& Lipshitz, 2000). Senge (1990) posits that organizations should adapt in 
response to difficulties by using feedback to “change the thinking that 
produced the problem in the first place” (p. 95). Prototypical learning occurs 
during postproject reviews in which the organization reviews a process or 
event to determine what procedures were successful and what procedures 
need to be corrected (Caroll, 1995; Di Bella, Nevis, & Gould, 1996). This 
review process can, and often does, involve comparing an organization’s 
actions against what are considered the best practices for the given context 
(Seeger, 2006).
Best practices as a mechanism for learning.
The identification of best practices has been associated with 
benchmarking (Kyro, 2004), whereby organizations seek to identify and 
replicate best practices of other organizations (Camp, 1989; Compton, 1992; 
Zairi, 1998). When used strategically, this comparison of best practices 
can offer optimal organizational procedures. However, if they are not 
continuously evaluated and improved, best practices can become outdated 
and detrimental (Bergman, Yassine, & Roemer, 2004). Using best practices in 
risk communication in a postcrisis evaluation not only tests the usefulness of 
the model, but also provides a learning experience and helps organizations 
determine how to improve future planning and response efforts. 
Case studies examining failure are abundant in crisis communication 
literature (Baum & Oliver, 1992; Brinson & Benoit, 1999; Dacin, 1997; 
Englehardt, Sallot, & Springston, 2001; Hearit, 1995; Ice, 1991; Massey, 
2001; Ruef & Scott, 1998; Seeger et al., 1998). By using best practices in risk 
communication to examine a case, organizations can evaluate their crisis 
response strategies as well as any pre-event procedures that may have led to 
the crisis.  
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The Anthrax Case
In October 2004, a livestock producer in Dunn County, North Dakota, 
discovered two head of cattle had died in his pasture. Multiple breakdowns 
in communication and procedure delayed the confirmation of the cause 
of death as anthrax. In the 2 weeks following the initial deaths—amidst 
confusion, contamination concerns, and confidentiality leaks—the producer 
lost a total of 15 head of cattle (Rafferty & Donovan, 2004), which is the 
equivalent of almost $20,000 (United States Department of Agriculture, 2006). 
Anthrax is endemic in North Dakota, and the number of confirmed 
cases each year ranges from a couple to a couple hundred depending on 
the moisture levels in the ground. However, the deaths occurred in a region 
with no previously reported cases of anthrax. In addition, anthrax is rarely 
reported in the cooler months of the year. After consulting a veterinarian 
from the local research Extension center, the producer initially suspected a 
nutrition-related problem. Cattle continued to die even after being removed 
from the pasture. The following week, the producer called additional 
veterinarians and a university researcher who worked with Extension. 
Anthrax was then discussed as a potential cause. Because the producer was 
informed that the diagnostic lab would not run blood tests over the weekend, 
he waited until the following week to take in samples. No treatment was 
administered while awaiting confirmation.
The producer, concerned for his family’s safety, turned to the Internet 
for information over the weekend. Post-9/11 reports of the anthrax terrorist 
attacks flooded his search results. Having no familiarity with bovine anthrax, 
the producer did not allow his daughter to leave the house for fear she might 
contract anthrax from the contaminated cattle. That same weekend, the 
rumor that anthrax was discovered in Dunn County had already reached an 
Extension meeting in a county on the other side of the state. 
The state veterinarian was first notified following the Extension 
meeting—a full 2 weeks after the first cases were discovered. The next 
day, the diagnostic lab ran the blood samples and confirmed that the cattle 
had anthrax. The dead cattle were burned and buried, and the remaining 
cattle in the herd were treated. The anthrax outbreak had been contained, 
but the Biosurveillance Working Group responsible for the crisis response 
recognized there was a breakdown in communication and protocol that 
delayed the response.
Methods
While much of the literature dealing with crisis and organizational 
learning is geared toward corporations, by defining an organization 
as a unified cohort of decision-makers, the literature can be applied to 
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universities, government agencies, and in this case, veterinarians, Extension 
agents, and university researchers brought together by a common goal. The 
Biosurveillance Working Group was established as part of a USDA Federal 
Relations Grant to review crisis-level livestock diseases with the stated 
goals of enhancing diagnostic capabilities, efficiently locating and working 
livestock, supporting field investigations, and improving communication. 
During a Biosurveillance Working Group meeting at the USDA 
Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) office in Bismarck 
the following April, researchers with the NCFPD used the best practices in 
risk communication to guide an exploratory analysis of the anthrax case. 
The method was naturalistic (Lincoln & Guba, 1985) in that the researchers 
adopted “strategies that parallel how people act in the course of daily 
life” (Taylor & Bogdan, 1998, p.8). Because postproject reviews in which 
the organization evaluates an event to determine the effectiveness of its 
procedures are common in the field (Caroll, 1995; Di Bella et al., 1996), 
participants could feel comfortable revealing work-related information 
(Taylor & Bogdan). 
Participants
Most participants were selected based on their involvement with the 
Biosurveillance Working Group. They included three Extension agents, 
three university researchers, three veterinarians from the state office, two 
veterinarians from USDA-APHIS, and one representative from Manitoba 
Agriculture and Food. While not a member of the Biosurveillance Working 
Group, the representative from Manitoba Agriculture and Food was invited 
to provide insight as to how anthrax cases are handled across the border. All 
members of the group were present either in person or via teleconference. 
Participation in the discussion was voluntary and the decision to 
participate in the study did not affect the standing of the participants in the 
Biosurveillance Working Group. If individuals decided not to participate, 
they were free to withdraw consent and discontinue participation at any 
time. Those participating in the discussion signed an informed consent form 
allowing the procedure to be recorded and studied. Permission to collect data 
was obtained from the relevant institutional review board.
Interview Guide
An interview guide was used to assure all aspects of the model would 
be discussed (Kvale, 1996). Moderators used open-ended questions that did 
not inhibit the participants from divulging more information than what was 
requested. Questions were based on the best practices in risk communication 
(Seeger, 2006). As each practice was introduced, the participants were asked 
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to relate what they had or had not done in the anthrax case that correlated 
with the practice. Additional inquiry was made when necessary to encourage 
clarification and elaboration (Spradley, 1979).
Procedures for Data Collection and Analysis
Thematic analysis techniques were used to analyze recurring themes 
within the data (Strauss & Corbin, 1990). The best practices in risk 
communication developed by NCFPD were used as the criterion-referenced, 
or anchored, material (Boyatzis, 1998). To analyze the data, researchers first 
followed Lincoln and Guba’s (1985) recommendation to create a schema in 
notes while moderating the discussion. While the themes naturally followed 
the model guiding the discussion, the researchers noted each time comments 
reverted to a previously discussed practice. Next, away from the interview 
environment, verbatim transcripts and notes were carefully and repeatedly 
reviewed for themes relating to best practices other than those being 
discussed at that time so as to determine relationships among the themes 
(Glaser & Strauss, 1967). The transcripts and notes were then reviewed for 
barriers to the best practices. In each segment, the researchers looked for 
negative comments referencing the practice. For example, if participants 
listed reasons why they could not have adhered to that particular practice 
in the anthrax case, those reasons constituted a barrier to accepting that 
practice. Lastly, to ensure the reliability of this process, a research assistant 
analyzed the notes and 20% of the transcripts to determine if the same 
relationships and barriers were found in the data. The researchers and the 
assistant agreed upon each occurrence of the themes in the sample data.
Results
The discussion followed the order depicted by the DHS-NCFPD 
model (Figure). The findings indicate the Biosurveillance Working Group 
recognized the presence of the best practices in risk communication. As each 
practice was introduced, the participants were able to relate what they had 
or had not done in the anthrax case with regard to each practice. Discussion 
time was evenly distributed among the three broad categories of strategic 
planning, proactive strategies, and strategic responses. The discussion 
regarding strategic planning was more holistic in that as the participants 
discussed planning pre-event logistics, coordinating networks, and accepting 
uncertainty, they consistently referred to the other categories, demonstrating 
the connectivity of the three practices. While references were made to other 
practices throughout the discussion, the connectivity of the practices was not 
as prominent as it was during strategic planning discussions. 
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Accepting uncertainty, listening to public concern, and being accessible 
to the media were not initially seen as priorities for the test group. Discussion 
regarding the presence of uncertainty was followed by discussion about 
how to remove uncertainty from the process. The discussion pointed to 
uncertainty as a barrier in the flow of communication for the Biosurveillance 
Working Group. Listening to public concern and being accessible to the 
media were discussed secondarily in that the most essential task at hand was 
dealing with the outbreak rather than what people were saying about the 
outbreak. The other practices were discussed without negative comments.
Throughout the discussion, three themes emerged as barriers to the 
best practices in risk communication: a) lack of education on the process of 
disease mitigation, b) ambiguity in the acceptable communication protocol, 
and c) fear of repercussions based on action or inaction following a trigger 
point. While other barriers were discussed, including short response time 
and geographical distance, these barriers were not seen as surmountable by 
adhering to best practices or enhanced communication protocols and are 
therefore outside the realm of this study. 
Pre-Event Logistics
In discussing pre-event logistics, participants sought to determine the 
trigger point to activate disease mitigation procedures. Discussion revealed 
that individuals within the mitigation network recognized different triggers, 
depending on experience with a particular disease in a geographic location. 
Participants did not agree on a single trigger point and recognized a need 
for education on determining trigger points in enacting the mitigation 
process. A veterinarian commented about why a producer might not contact 
a veterinarian when needed: “That would probably be lack of awareness of 
what may be going on in the area or lack of awareness of what the symptoms 
are.” Participants described Extension agents as essential to the education 
system that ensures producers are aware of potential diseases in the area. 
However, the Extension agents participating in the discussion stated they 
were unaware of the trigger points.
A major barrier identified in establishing a predetermined trigger point 
was that there was no protocol to follow in the case of a disease outbreak, 
and if a protocol did exist, those involved in the mitigation process were not 
aware of it. A university researcher commented:
That was one question we asked of the Extension director, and his 
response was, you give us a protocol to follow, and that’s what the 
agents will do.… If we had the same trigger points that we just listed 
here, and that went into a protocol to Extension agents, whether they 
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were nutritionists, Extensionists, or veterinarians, or whatever, that 
might help. 
As the discussion progressed, the state veterinarian produced a book of 
statutes explaining which diseases should be reported to state and federal 
veterinarians; however, the participants stated that they were unaware of the 
statutes. 
Coordinating Networks
Participants associated the coordination of networks with establishing 
pre-event logistics. Participants felt that the communication protocol in 
the disease mitigation process was ambiguous, in that multiple routes of 
communication could be taken from the producer to the state veterinarian, 
including routes through local veterinarians, free veterinarians, multiple 
individuals within Extension services, and technicians at the diagnostic 
lab. Because some producers in remote areas do not have a veterinarian 
within a 150-mile radius, multiple people may be contacted and crucial 
time may be lost before a disease is diagnosed. The participants viewed the 
multiple communication routes as a barrier to mitigating the disease quickly. 
A university researcher commented, “They [the veterinarians] may be, 
oftentimes, a long ways away. Therefore, you get more people in that, just by 
necessity, there are more people that get involved and muddy up the chain.” 
In assessing this particular anthrax case, another university researcher stated: 
I don’t think there was any flow. I think it was just a haphazard 
combination of people being visited….. I’m not trying to be negative, 
I’m just saying, I think that compilation of contacts is not in an 
organized manner.
The producer must start the mitigation process by following one of the 
routes of communication within the established networks. However, the 
participants were concerned that fear might inhibit producers from reporting 
a disease. A veterinarian said:
I was just going to say, maybe, when we are talking about other 
things that might inhibit people from reporting previously, and 
I think fear might be part of that, too; in that, what if there is 
something truly going on here and the federal government comes 
along and kills all my cows because I have a highly contagious 
disease?
Just as fear might prevent the producer from contacting a veterinarian, 
so too may fear affect whether or not a veterinarian acts in the event of a 
potentially dangerous disease. A veterinarian said, “We’ve never required 
that the lab confirm it [a field diagnosis]; we went ahead and quarantined 
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and recommended vaccinating.” Without lab verification of a disease, the 
producer may experience undue expenses if the veterinarian makes an 
incorrect field diagnosis. At the same time, a correct field diagnosis can save 
crucial time that would have been spent waiting for lab results. If, however, 
the veterinarian does not report a disease because he or she is uncertain of 
the severity of the situation, he or she may face repercussions. A veterinarian 
commented, “There, again, this is like developing something like the best 
management processes so that you end up being the one responsible for 
not having reported something.” While the participants agreed that a 
veterinarian must accept uncertainty at some level to determine when to 
report a disease, they viewed this practice as an unfortunate byproduct of a 
crisis.
Accepting Uncertainty
The participants also recognized uncertainty as a potential trigger 
point. A university researcher stated, “To me, maybe a trigger point is 
when you’ve got producers, the veterinarian, or anyone else involved 
uncertain as to what the next thing to do is. They should contact someone 
to help them with making that decision.” Uncertainty was also seen as 
a barrier in the flow of communication for the Biosurveillance Working 
Group by providing multiple routes of communication from the producer 
to the state veterinarian. One veterinarian commented that the multiple 
routes of communication they encourage to ease the flow of information 
actually increase the uncertainty in the communication process. Regardless 
of the Biosurveillance Working Group’s dislike for uncertainty in strategic 
planning, the participants did recognize that most crises inherently involve 
uncertainty.
Forming Partnerships
It was evident that the many different individuals involved in the 
process between the time the producer discovered the situation and the time 
word reached the state veterinarian (such as local veterinarians, veterinarian 
medical officers, and Extension agents) were essential in gathering the 
information required for mitigation. Because the producer may be unsure 
of the process and may be apprehensive about what could happen if a 
communicable disease were to be found in the herd, he or she may feel 
more comfortable working with local sources rather than involving the state 
veterinarian. When asked if a producer would contact the state veterinarian, 
the state veterinarian’s answer was, “It is very unlikely. Clients who call 
do not tell you everything. They are fearful of what might happen. I just 
refer them back to their local vet.” The participants agreed that without the 
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partnerships between individuals who the producer deems trustworthy and 
the state veterinarian’s office, some diseases would go unreported. Once a 
disease has been confirmed, however, there is direct communication from 
the state veterinarian’s office to the local veterinarian and producer. The 
state veterinarian said, “Rather than reporting it down through the masses 
and turning it into gossip, you pull it up, and then there is a decision there.” 
The participants stated that everything is urgent to the producer, so having a 
short communication route helps reduce unwarranted concern. 
Listening to Public Concern
The Biosurveillance Working Group did not initially consider listening 
to public concern to be part of its role in mitigating a disease outbreak. A 
veterinarian said, “Our decisions are probably not influenced by public 
concern because we are just doing what we know needs to be done.” 
When it was discovered that the previously discussed producer would 
not allow his daughter to leave the house because he was afraid she might 
contract anthrax, the discussion turned to how the Biosurveillance Working 
Group can strengthen partnerships with public health services to provide 
information as to whether or not bovine diseases can infect humans. The 
participants expressed concern that by providing that sort of information, 
they would overstep their bounds and take on the role of caring for the 
producer’s health, when their actual role is to care for the animals. 
Being Open and Honest
While the participants all agreed there is no reason to hide information, 
the fear of inciting panic caused some to question how much to say. A 
university researcher commented:
It was a fear of mine in this particular case; surely, you don’t want 
to cause panic out there. Because, do we know what panic in this 
particular case we’re talking about? I know it went through my mind 
Sunday evening when I heard about it. I don’t want people to panic 
because of the fact that we have a case here.
A veterinarian said, “You’ve either reported too much, in somebody’s 
mind, or you’ve reported too little, and a lot of that, there again, has to do 
with the level of what you know about the situation.” The participants 
became even more guarded when the media were asking questions.
Being Accessible to the Media
 The participants viewed the media as a resource for disseminating 
essential information. A veterinarian said, “We have a responsibility to 
the health system to let people know immediately…quarantine or to stop 
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rumors.” However, in the anthrax case, the story was not released to the 
media until the middle of November. In the article, the state veterinarian 
said she chose not to publicize the information right away in order to avoid 
an unnecessary scare. Being accessible to the media was not considered a 
priority. A veterinarian said:
Really, it is more important that you are spending all your time and 
effort on communicating to people you need to and not on press 
releases. And we’re trying to delegate that within our department so 
that we don’t talk to and visit with the media on the phone, and have 
a preplanned press release for review.
According to the Biosurveillance Working Group, the media usually 
want a local twist, so they contact local veterinarians or Extension 
agents instead of using comments from the state office. Extension agents 
commented that there is no guarantee media calls will be returned. No 
guidelines are in place for who should and should not speak to the media; 
however, at the time of the meeting, they had not experienced any bad 
publicity due to individuals responding to reporters. 
Communicating Compassion
After discussing the case of the producer who feared for the safety of 
his family, the discussion on communicating compassion was very short. 
The Biosurveillance Working Group understood it was a very difficult time 
for the producer in question. An Extension agent stated, “These people 
are suffering. They didn’t necessarily bring this upon themselves. It’s a 
misfortune.” Neighbors are often concerned about their own well-being. The 
participants said they try to educate neighbors to alleviate their concerns; 
however, the outcome is not always positive. A veterinarian said, “It doesn’t 
always go the way you want, because once you give the information, you 
can’t control it. . . . They [the neighbors] called meetings; they had several 
town hall-like meetings.”
The representative from Manitoba Agriculture and Food experienced a 
worse scenario in another case:
It went so far as people with connected farms were not welcome 
to come to church. If you ever needed to go to church…when your 
property is populated with whatever animal disease, that’s a time 
when you need your church community the worst. And they were 
not welcome at church, and neighbors would phone up and disinvite 
their children to things like birthday parties because they’re farmers.
Considering the potential repercussions associated with reporting 
a livestock disease, the Biosurveillance Working Group indicated that it 
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understood why so many producers are afraid to initiate the call to start the 
mitigation process. The participants saw communicating compassion as an 
essential role, though it may not be one they are qualified to play.
Providing Self-Efficacy
The Biosurveillance Working Group discussed how giving producers 
something meaningful to do can help alleviate some of the fears brought 
on by a disease. In this anthrax case, participants found that it was best to 
allow the producer to communicate with neighbors as a form of self-efficacy, 
thereby reducing concern and backlash from neighbors and providing a 
learning opportunity for the surrounding ranching community. An Extension 
agent said, “The producer went from wanting to hide the fact that they were 
buying penicillin, to calling neighbors as they got more comfortable with 
what was happening and knew more about it.” Other procedures, including 
cleaning and disinfecting, vaccinating, and coordinating records, were 
discussed. The participants also recognized how surrounding producers 
stepped up disease mitigation efforts, including using radio frequency 
identification (RFID) tags to track cattle. An Extension agent said:
Some of the producers are resisting traceability with RFIDs and those 
kinds of things, and this particular producer said to me, he said, after 
you’ve explained this to me, if you need somebody to speak up for 
the fact that we need to do a better job with RFIDs, he said, I’ll be 
more than willing to do it. Because, he said, that’s evidence that we 
need to be able to follow them [the cattle].
Continuously Evaluating and Updating Crisis Plans
The remainder of the discussion centered on how the Biosurveillance 
Working Group was going to proceed in updating the mitigation process. 
Suggestions were made to create a communication flow chart and a set of 
best practices specific to the Biosurveillance Working Group. A veterinarian 
commented, “I think we have a list of good ideas and possibilities we might 
do differently next time and prepare for it.” Other suggestions included 
educational meetings organized by Extension agents to help alleviate 
uncertainty and fear. Though the best practice of continuously evaluating 
and updating crisis plans was not part of the discussion, the Biosurveillance 
Working Group embraced this practice, as was evident in the group’s 
willingness to evaluate the crisis in order to improve its processes.
Discussion
Although the best practices in risk communication established at the 
time of the meeting were all discussed in this case, participants did not 
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view accepting uncertainty as a best practice and did not initially view 
listening to public concern and being accessible to the media as priorities. 
The Biosurveillance Working Group repeatedly discussed how to remove 
uncertainty from the process and pointed to the practice as a barrier in the 
flow of communication. The group also determined the most essential task 
at hand was dealing with the outbreak, rather than dealing with what people 
were saying about the outbreak. Seeger (2006) contends that accepting 
some level of uncertainty is critical, as warnings are often needed before 
the full nature of the harm is known. “Organizations must demonstrate 
respect, concern, commitment, and aligned interests with the concerned 
publics” (Heath, 2006, p. 246). The state veterinarian specifically cited 
not wanting to create a scare as the reason why she waited to report the 
case to the media, but withholding information from the public actually 
decreases the probability that it will respond appropriately (Sandman 
& Lanard, 2004). Venette (2006) notes that many of the best practices are 
counterintuitive: “When pressure to present accurate, timely information is 
high, the tendencies to guard information, over-reassure the public, and deny 
responsibility often increase”(p. 230).
Three themes emerged as barriers to the best practices: a) lack of 
education on the process of disease mitigation, b) ambiguity in the acceptable 
communication protocol, and c) fear of repercussions based on action or 
inaction following a trigger point. Seeger (2006) notes, “…if information 
about a crisis is not shared openly by the organization engaged in the crisis, 
the public will obtain information from other sources” (p. 239). Sandman 
(2006) stresses the importance of acknowledging fear in risk and crisis: “If the 
crisis itself arouses fear—as it often does—the job of the crisis communicator 
is to help us bear our fear, and to guide the choice of precautionary actions 
our fear motivates” (p. 258). To address the barriers identified in the 
discussion and standardize communication (Bergman et al., 2004; Cohen 
& Sproull, 1996), the Biosurveillance Working Group intends to create a 
communication flow chart and a set of best practices specific to the disease 
mitigation process.
The Biosurveillance Working Group took part in a prototypical 
postproject review to determine what procedures were successful and what 
procedures needed to be corrected (Caroll, 1995; Di Bella et al., 1996). The 
discussion of the anthrax case acted as a stimulus for change (Huber, 1991; 
Lerbinger, 1997; Seeger et al., 2003), and the participants were strategically 
adaptive in learning from the failures illuminated by the discussion (Argyris, 
1982; Senge, 1990; Sitkin, 1996). 
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Conclusions 
Evaluating best practices allows an organization to learn from failures 
and crises by establishing alternative strategies and thereby potentially 
preventing future crises. When used strategically, best practices can 
offer optimal organizational procedures. This study suggests that the 
DHS-NCFPD best practices for risk communication offer a means for 
organizations to engage in a thoughtful and thorough postcrisis evaluation of 
their communication. In doing so, a crisis event can serve as a turning point, 
as it did for the Biosurveillance Working Group. Organizations from all 
genres can make use of this best practices model to facilitate positive change 
in response to crises.
For agriculture educators and communicators, this case study can serve 
not only as an example of how to use the best practices model in a postcrisis 
review, but also as a vicarious learning tool for veterinarians and Extension 
agents. We cannot assume all veterinarians, Extension agents, and university 
researchers understand the necessity of accepting uncertainty, listening 
to public concern, and being accessible to the media based on this case. 
Potential barriers to adhering to the best practices in risk communication 
have now been identified. This case demonstrates that communication is 
essential in disease mitigation and can be used to support education and 
research collaboration with veterinary and Extension services. 
To prevent livestock markets around the world from plummeting 
due to naturally occurring livestock disease outbreaks and the potential 
of agroterrorist attacks, organizations within the high-risk industry of 
agriculture need to examine disease mitigation processes. And as our world 
continues to become more uncertain and complicated, other organizations 
should embrace the opportunities to learn by assessing past cases and 
the experiences of similar organizations. By evaluating a crisis using best 
practices as a benchmarking procedure, an organization can not only 
determine problems within the system, but also identify strategies that do 
not align with established recommendations.
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